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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
DOUGLAS MCKAY, JR.* R. HOKE ROBINSON**
H. SIMMONS TATE, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
As in the past, this topic has proven a hodge-podge of
unrelated subjects. For this reason, we have attempted to
organize the many cases reviewed under the topics herein-
after noted. The order in which the topics fall is opened with
the occurrences which are preliminary to trial, then continues
with those during trial, and finally winds up with those mat-
ters affecting review.
Therefore, the topics covered are the following:
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I. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Two rather interesting cases relate to securing jurisdiction
of foreign corporations; one involves mail order insurance
companies, the other a bank.
The cases of Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co. and
Ross v. American Standard Ins. Corp.,' which were consoli-
dated on appeal, involved an action for fraudulent breach of
an insurance contract and one for fraud and deceit in inducing
plaintiff to enter into an insurance contract. Both defendants
were Indiana corporations not licensed to do business in South
Carolina and having no office, agents or property here. The
plaintiff had taken out a policy by mail with the second de-
fendant above, which corporation was later reinsured with
the first defendant, and sometime later the latter company
cancelled the plaintiff's policy. The question, raised by special
appearance and motion to vacate service, was whether juris-
diction of the defendants was obtained by service on the South
Carolina Insurance Commissioner under the terms of the
South Carolina Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act,2 the per-
tinent portion of which is as follows :3
The issuance and delivery of a policy of insurance or
contract of insurance or indemnity to any person in this
State or the collection of a premium thereon by any in-
surer not licensed in this State, as herein required, shall
irrevocably constitute the Commissioner and his suc-
cessors in office the true and lawful attorney in fact
upon whom service of any and all processes, pleadings,
actions or suits arising out of such policy or contract in
behalf of such insured may be made.
The Court referred to the tremendous growth in the mail
order insurance business in recent years, the problems where
an insured has to go to a foreign jurisdiction, the enactment
of substituted service statutes by many states, and the settle-
ment of the due process question by the decision of the U. S.
Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.
4
It then held that the action for fraudulent breach of con-
tract, though permitting punitive damages, is one ex contractu
and not ex delicto, and is clearly within the scope of the
above-quoted act authorizing service on the Insurance Coin-
1. 232 S. C. 433, 102 S. E. 2d 743 (1958).
2. CoDE OF LAWS OF SoUTHr CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 37-261 et seq.
3. Ibid., § 37-265.
4. 355 U. S. 220 (1958).
[Vol. II
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missioner in "actions or suits arising out of such policy or
contract." The Court went on to hold, however, that an action
for fraud and deceit in the inducement, which is an action
ex delicto, is not one arising out of a policy of insurance, be-
cause in such action the insured elects to treat the policy as
void and his measure of damages is based on the premiums
paid and not on the policy benefits. The motion to vacate
service in the fraudulent breach action was correctly denied,
but that in the fraud and deceit action should have been
granted.
In Bank for Savings and Trusts v. Towe,5 a special appear-
ance by a foreign bank was set aside, and service on the attor-
ney who had represented the bank in an earlier declaratory
judgment proceeding was held sufficient to ascertain juris-
diction.
The bank previously had sought a declaratory judgment to
determine the rights of certain classes of persons in a pension
trust fund which it administered as trustee, and the bank did
not perfect its appeal from an order which held a certain class
eligible to participate and left the action open for others
similarly situated to intervene.
The Supreme Court held that since the attorney who had
represented the bank had not been dismissed and the order
in the earlier proceeding had left the action open to allow
others to intervene, service on the attorney was proper.
II. VENUE
The oft-discussed question of venue vs. jurisdiction, or ju-
risdiction of the person vs. jurisdiction of subject-matter, was
before the court in Taylor v. Wall.6 The action was brought
in Aiken County by residents of that county against a resident
of McCormick County for failure to perform a paving con-
tract on Aiken County real estate in a workmanlike manner,
but the complaint did not allege the residence of the defend-
ant. The defendant, attempting to follow Section 10-642, 7 de-
murred on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant or the subject of the action,
contending that the cause of action was for breach of contract
and he was entitled to have it tried in the county of his
residence.
5. 231 S. C. 268, 98 S. E. 2d 539 (1957).
6. 231 S. C. 683, 100 S. E. 2d 400 (1957).
7. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
1958]
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The Court upheld the overruling of the demurrer on the
ground that it did not appear on the face of the complaint
that there was no jurisdiction of the person or of the subject
of the action, and found it unnecessary to pass on whether
the action was one for injury to real property or for breach
of contract, since the defendant had not appropriately raised
this question. It pointed out that his proper remedy was to
move to change the place of trial pursuant to Section 10-310,8
on the ground that the county designated in the complaint was
not the proper county. The decisions in Brigman v. One 1947
Ford" and earlier cases were relied upon in reaching the de-
cision, and the principle that jurisdiction of the person may
be waived, but jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be
waived even by consent, was reaffirmed.
If the McCormick County residence of the defendant had
appeared on the face of the complaint, would the demurrer
lie? Based on the language of the Brigmtan case the cause
"cannot be dismissed but must be transferred to the proper
county where the court does have jurisdiction." Your reviewer
respectfully submits that when the Court speaks of "jurisdic-
tion of the person" in these cases it is really referring to
"venue" rather than "jurisdiction".
In Thomas & Howard Co. v. Marion Lumber Co.10 an order
of the Civil Court of Horry refusing a change of venue to
Marion County was reversed and the change granted. The
defendant was a domestic corporation with its principal place
of business, office and agents in Marion County, which there-
fore was its legal residence. It made occasional deliveries of
lumber in Horry County when such was purchased from the
plant in Marion. The Court held this was not sufficient to
constitute the owning of property or transacting of business
as contemplated by Section 10-421, and found the instant case
very close to that of Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Co.1
where a similar result was reached.
The respondent also argued that appellant should have made
a special appearance and motion to dismiss because the Civil
Court of Horry lacked jurisdiction of the person of the appel-
lant, rather than moving for change of venue. The Supreme
8. Ibid.
9. 213 S. C. 546, 50 S. E. 2d 688 (1948).
10. 232 S. C. 304, 101 S. E. 2d 848 (1958).
11. 228 S. C. 287, 89 S. E. 2d 755 (1955).
[Vol. 11
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Court held that appellant had followed the proper procedure,
citing, among others, the case of Taylor v. Wall, supra.
In Perdue v. Southern Ry.12 decedent's administrator sued
the railroad company and the resident driver of the automo-
bile in which decedent was riding when it collided with a
boxcar. The accident had occurred in Charlotte, North Caro-
lina, and the defendant railroad, a non-resident of the County
of Darlington where suit was brought, moved for a change of
venue to York County, South Carolina on the grounds that
the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice would be
promoted thereby, contending that plaintiff had joined co-
defendant Galloway, the driver of the automobile, and a resi-
dent of Darlington County, merely for the purpose of retain-
ing venue in Darlington County. The trial judge denied the
railroad's motion to change the venue and the Supreme Court
adhered to its oft-recited rule that
Motions of this character are addressed to the dis-
cretion of the lower Court, and its ruling on such mat-
ters will not be disturbed unless it appears from the facts
presented that the Court committed a manifest abuse
of a sound judicial discretion....
The right of the defendant in a civil action to trial in
the county of his residence . . . is a substantial right
[citing cases] ; and this Court has repeatedly held that
a jury of the vicinage passing upon the credibility of
witnesses is in itself a promotion of justice.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence before the lower
court supported his findings that it would be more convenient
for most witnesses to try the case in Darlington County than
in York County, and held further that it could not be con-
tended that the defendant driver was not material since the
defendant railroad had contended in its answer that the
decedent's death arose solely from the negligence of the de-
fendant driver.
Again in Herndon v. Huckabee Transport Corp.'3 the Su-
preme Court declined to disturb the order of the lower court
denying defendant's motion for change of venue from Hamp-
ton County to Colleton County in which latter county the
plaintiff resided and the accident occurred. The Supreme
Court held that the record did not disclose any manifest
abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
12. 232 S. C. 78, 101 S. E. 2d 47 (1957).
13. 231 S. C. 364, 98 S. E. 2d 833 (1957).
1958]
5
McKay et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1958
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
In Doss v. Douglass Construction Co.14 suit was originally
brought in Lexington County against the defendant construc-
tion company only for an automobile collision which occurred
in Richland County. Before the twenty days for answering
had expired, plaintiffs amended their complaints to include
as co-defendant the truck driver Cook, who was himself a
resident of Lexington County. Both Cook and the construction
company moved for a change of venue to Richland County
on grounds of convenience of witnesses, and the construction
company included an additional ground that it was not a cor-
poration but a trade name of an individual who was a resi-
dent and citizen of Richland County.
The circuit judge found that the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice would be promoted by trial in Lexing-
ton County and overruled the motion of both defendants to
transfer the case to Richland County, the place of accident,
for trial. The Supreme Court on appeal adhered to its policy
of affirming the lower court on the ground that there was no
manifest abuse of discretion.
In Belger v. Caldwell'5 suit was brought for the death of
a pedestrian in Hampton County against Caldwell, a resident
of Colleton County and the driver of the car which struck the
pedestrian, and against Smith, a resident of Hampton County,
the driver of a car which allegedly failed to dim its lights so
as to cause Caldwell's car to go out of control. Caldwell moved
to change venue to Colleton County on the ground that that
was the place of his residence and the jotnder of Smith as
a defendant was merely to confer venue upon Hampton
County. The trial judge overruled the motion for change of
venue and on appeal the Supreme Court sustained the trial
judge on the ground that under conflicting affidavits his de-
cision would not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error.
King v. Moore"" is somewhat unusual in that it is a second
appeal to the Supreme Court on the question of venue, the
defendants having prevailed in the earlier case"' by having
service against a co-defendant determined invalid and mala
fide and thereby causing the place of trial to be changed from
Berkeley County where the accident occurred to Florence
County where the defendant resided. The plaintiffs, how-
14. 232 S. C. 261, 101 S. E. 2d 661 (1958).
15. 231 S. C. 355, 98 S. E. 2d '758 (1957).
16. 231 S. C. 421, 98 S. E. 2d 849 (1957).
17. King v. Moore, 224 S. C. 400, 79 S. E. 2d 460 (1953).
[Vol. 11
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ever, after the case was moved to Florence County, applied
to the lower court for an order transferring it back to Berke-
ley County on the ground that the convenience of witnesses
and ends of justice would be promoted thereby. The trial
judge agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered that the venue
be changed back to Berkeley County where the accident oc-
curred and most witnesses resided. The Supreme Court, on
appeal in this second case, declined to disturb the actions of
the trial judge on the ground that there was no manifest error.
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
In Charleston and Western Carolina Ry. v. Joyce'8 the rail-
road sought a declaration of its right to remove certain cross-
ties pursuant to a contract and deed between the parties; in
other words, an interpretation of these instruments. On mo-
tion the lower court struck certain counterclaims in the
answer after an admission by defendant that an interpreta-
tion of the contract was absolutely necessary. Thereafter the
defendant sought to amend her answer to allege facts which
took place prior to the written documents which the court
was asked to interpret. The Supreme Court upheld the action
of the trial court in refusing the motion to amend, noting that
no charge of abuse of discretion had been made. It also said
that to permit the amendments would have been, in effect, to
overrule the order striking the counterclaims, which order had
not been appealed and had therefore become the law of the
case.
The Court held there was no error in granting the declara-
tory judgment without taking testimony, where the sole ques-
tion was the interpretation of a contract the language of
which was free from ambiguity. It upheld the interpretation
of the trial court as the only reasonable one. And finally, it
concluded that the case was not tried piecemeal (see Williams
Furniture Co. v. Southern Coatings & Chemical Co.) 11 but
that it determined the only issue necessary to decide the dis-
pute between the parties.
In Taco Corporation v. Hudson20 an action was brought for
declaratory judgments asking the court to determine the par-
ties' rights and liabilities under a patent licensing contract.
The Supreme Court sustained without comment the trial
18. 231 S. 0. 493, 99 S. E. 2d 187 (1957).
19. 216 S. C. 1, 56 S. E. 2d 576 (1949).
20. 231 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 2d 419 (1957).
19581
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judge's ruling that the complaint stated a "justiciable con-
troversy" and holding that it presented a proper subject for
a declaratory judgment suit under Section 10-2003.21
IV. DIscovERY
In Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company22 the
defendant, being sued for injuries allegedly suffered by plain-
tiff in a railroad accident, applied to the circuit judge for an
order permitting defendant to examine plaintiff before trial.
Defendant sought information as to plaintiff's prior medical
history, names of physicians who had treated him and of hos-
pitals, including federal institutions where he had been con-
fined, which information defendant contended was essential
to the proper defense of the action.
In due course, first ex parte and later after due notice to
plaintiff, defendant secured orders from the lower court per-
mitting it to examine plaintiff before trial.
Plaintiff appealed therefrom to the Supreme Court con-
tending the lower court had improperly ordered him to answer
the questions, and that the information sought was absolutely
privileged. The Supreme Court overruled both contentions,
saying:
Determination of whether "good and sufficient cause"
for examination under this statute has been shown is ad-
dressed to the discretion of the Circuit Judge ....
..... It is contended that the affidavit upon which the
order was issued is defective in that some of the facts are
stated on information and belief without disclosing the
source of such information as required by United States
Tire Company v. Keystone Tire Sales Co.2 3 It may not be
amiss to state that appellant made no showing contra-
dictory to the facts contained in this affidavit. The Cir-
cuit Judge had before him not only this affidavit but the
pleadings. After careful consideration, we think there
was enough to justify the Court below in ordering this
examination.
As to the contention of privilege the Court said:
There only remains the question of whether under the
law of South Carolina communications between physician
21. CODu OF LAws OF SouTTI CAROLINA, 1952.
22. 232 S. C. 274, 101 S. E. 2d 821 (1958).
23. 153 S. C. 56, 150 S. E. 347, 66 A. L. R. 1264 (1929).
[Vol. 11
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and patient are privileged. There was no such privilege
at common law .... Statutes have been enacted in most
states making communications between physician and
patient privileged from compulsory disclosure but as
pointed out by Judge Whaley in his Handbook on Evi-
dence, there is no such statute in South Carolina ....
Therefore, the common-law rule prevails. (Omissions
ours.)
Mills Mill v. Hawkins24 was a proceeding to test the con-
stitutionality of a water district act. The appellants had
sought to require the respondents to produce the report of
an engineering firm as to the lay-out, cost and other matters
with respect to the proposed water and sewer systems in the
district. It appeared that in 1946 a group of citizens had
initiated a movement to obtain water and sewerage for the
area and had engaged the engineering firm to draw plans
and specifications and make cost estimates pertaining to the
area. The data had been used several years previously in a
proceeding before the Commissioner of Public Works wherein
such facilities had been sought. The lower court declined to
order the respondents to produce the engineering reports. The
Supreme Court sustained the lower court, saying:
Respondents, who were not parties to that proceeding,
testified that they had seen the plans made by the Beebe
Company but did not have them and did not know where
they were. We agree with the trial Judge that appellants
should have subpoenaed the members of this firm and
required them to bring the plans into Court. We find no
error. (Emphasis added.)
V. CHOICE OF REMEDIES
In Barnwell Production Credit Ass'n v. Hartzog25 the
plaintiff contended its action was equitable, being to foreclose
a chattel mortgage. Defendants said it was a law action of
claim and delivery, and pleaded various defenses in the answer
charging plaintiff with misrepresentations, fraud and deceit
and other delicts. The lower court construed the actions as
being equitable, and granted a general order of reference from
which defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held:
It is elementary that a pleading is to be liberally con-
strued in favor of the pleader .... An equally well settled
24. 232 S. C. 515, 103 S. E. 2d 14 (1958).
25. 231 S. C. 340, 98 S. E. 2d 835 (1957).
19581
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principle of law is that the character of the action is pri-
marily determined by the allegations of the complaint....
Where, as here, several remedies are available to the
plaintiff, it is he, not the defendant, who may choose
which of them he will pursue; and the Court, in constru-
ing a complaint in such a case suggestive of more than
one theory, will sustain the theory intended by the
pleader, if it be supported by the allegations, and will
reject as surplusage allegations not in harmony with it.
Answering defendants' contention that the various law de-
fenses raised in their return entitled them to a jury trial the
Supreme Court said:
We have long held that in such case the issues thus
raised are to be tried'on the equity side of the Court and
do not entitle the defendant to trial by jury as a matter
of right.
The defendants' objection that the circuit judge erred in
treating certain statements of plaintiff's counsel as being in
the nature of an election was overruled. The Supreme Court
said:
Election of remedies is the act of choosing one of two
or more inconsistent remedies allowed by law in the
state of facts .... The issue before the Circuit Judge did
not, in reality, involve the principle of election; for
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant contended that as
to the chattel mortgage the complaint sought two or more
inconsistent remedies .... The issue was not of election,
but of construction of the complaint; and the statement
in Judge Henderson's order to the effect that he took the
statement of plaintiff's counsel as "in the nature of an
election" must be viewed as meaning that he considered
it as expressing counsel's construction of the complaint,
rather, than as an election in the strict sense of that word.
(Omissions ours.)
In White v. Livingston26 plaintiff brought an action in
equity to set aside a deed on grounds of fraud. It was referred
to a special referee, who found the deed valid because appel-
lant had failed to prove the allegations of his complaint. The
appellant on appeal contended inter alia that the referee
should have held the deed to be an equitable mortgage given
26. 231 S. C. 301, 98 S. E. 2d 534 (1957).
[Vol. ii
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for the purpose of securing the repayment of a loan. With
reference to this the Supreme Court said:
Regardless of whether appellant may have had a meri-
torious cause of action to have the deed construed as a
mortgage, which we do not consider, we agree with the
trial judge that such relief is not available to him be-
cause he did not seek it by his complaint and did not offer
his own or other testimony that such was the intention
of the parties to the deed. The case was tried before the
referee, consonant with the allegations of the complaint,
as an action to set aside the deed for fraud, which it was.
It is well settled that one cannot present and try his case
on one theory and thereafter advocate another theory on
appeal ....
Just reason for the rule is very plain here. Relating it
to the facts of the case, respondent was alerted by the
complaint to defend against the charge of fraud in the
procurement, execution and delivery of the deed, which
she did successfully in the trial before the referee. She
was not noticed to defend against a claim that it was
intended as a mortgage. It would be unfair to her to
require that she resist such claim after the trial before
the referee and when his decision was before the court-
upon exceptions to it. The trial, with its opportunity to
defend, was over. (Emphasis and omissions ours.)
VI. CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS
McKinney v. Greenville Ice & Fuel Co. 27 involved a collision
between defendant's truck and an automobile occupied by the
driver and a passenger. The passenger sued the driver and
the truck owner jointly in one action, and the automobile
driver sued the truck owner alone in another action. The truck
owner moved to consolidate both actions which the trial judge
refused to allow. The truck owner appealed and the Supreme
Court sustained the lower court, saying:
In Kennedy v. Empire State Underwriters of Water-
town, N. y.,28 we pointed out the distinction between true
consolidation of cases and their trial together for con-
venience, to-wit: That in true consolidation the several
actions are combined into one, losing their separate iden-
27. 232 S. C. 257, 101 S. E. 2d 659 (1958).
28. 202 S. C. 38, 24 S. B. 2d 78 (1943).
i958]
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tity and becoming a single action in which a single judg-
ment is rendered; whereas if they are simply tried to-
gether for convenience or, as it is sometimes said, "con-
solidated for trial", they do not merge into one, but each
remains separate in all procedural matters other than the
joint trial.
Only where the parties are identical and the causes of
action such as may have been united in the same com-
plaint under Section 10-701 of the 1952 Code may the
Court, in its discretion, order consolidation over objec-
tion of either party ....
Where the parties are not the same, several cases may,
by their consent, but not otherwise, be tried together for
convenience .... (Omissions ours.)
The Court held that though the causes of action of the motor
vehicle driver and passenger arose out of the same tortious
acts, they were separate, and not joint, and could not have
been joined in the same complaint under Section 10-701.29 In
disposing of the truck owner's contention that the motor ve-
hicle driver could have set up her cause of action against it
as a counterclaim or cross action in the action which had been
brought against the driver and the truck owner by the passen-
ger, the Court held that Code section 10-70720 permitting cross
claims did not give the defendant truck owner the right to
require consolidation of the two cases. The Court, after quot-
ing the Code section, held in effect that the statute conferred
no right on the truck owner since it was not seeking to set
up a cause of action against either plaintiff nor did it suggest
that it had a cause of action against either.
VII. PLEADINGS-AMENDMENT OR REPLEADING
AFTER TIME
In several cases involving the filing or amendment of plead-
ings after -time, the Supreme Court re-emphasized its policy
of leaving the question to the discretion of the trial judge.
Some of these are discussed elsewhere herein under "Reopen-
ing Default Judgment".
In Simonds v. Sinonds"' the Court affirmed the trial judge's
refusal to permit defendant to serve and file a supplemental
29. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952. See also Ryder v. Jeffer-
son Hotel Co., 121 S. C. 72, 113 S. E. 474, 25 A. L. R. 739 (1922).
30. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
31. 232 S. C. 185, 101 S. E. 2d 494 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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anmwer. In a prior appeal the Supreme Court had held the
alleged grounds for divorce inadequate and had remanded the
case to determine whether there should be separate mainte-
nance. Although Section 10-61032 allows a party "on motion"
to make supplemental pleadings to include matters arising
after the former pleading or of which the party was ignorant
at the time of the former pleading the Court held that allow-
ance of such a, motion lay within the discretion of the trial
judge and that it would not be allowed unless in the interests
of justice. A prima facie case must be made that the supple-
mental pleading will raise new or previously unknown mat-
ter. Since in this case everything the defendant sought to
raise had either been alleged by him in an earlier pleading
or adduced as evidence at the hearings, the trial judge's re-
fusal to permit a supplemental pleading was affirmed.
The trial judge's discretion was upheld in Vasiliades v.
Vasiliades3 3 where defendant was permitted to answer after
time for answering had expired, because the intervening time
had been consumed by several motions and hearings. In Wil-
liams v. Ray34 the Supreme Court declined to disturb the trial
judge's order denying the defendant the right to answer after
the time expired.
VIII. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO VACATE
PRIOR ORDER
In Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. 35 the Supreme Court
said with reference to the power of the trial judge to vacate
an earlier order made by him:
The first contention on this appeal is that Judge Grim-
ball erred in vacating the order made by him on January
19, 1957. Appellant said that the fact that this order was
procured by respondents precludes them from seeking to
vacate it. It is generally held that Courts of General
Jurisdiction have the inherent power to vacate or set aside
their own judgments .... And the fact that the party who
obtained such order is the one who is seeking to have it
vacated does not necessarily preclude the Court from
setting it aside ....
32. CoDn OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
33. 231 S. C. 366, 98 S. E. 2d 810 (1957).
34. 232 S. C. 373, 102 S. E. 2d 368 (1958).
35. 232 S. C. 274, 101 S. E. 2d 821 (1958).
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We think under the foregoing authority Judge Grim-
ball was clearly empowered to vacate his order which had
been issued without notice to appellant. No rights of third
parties have intervened. Appellant argues that the vaca-
tion of the order of January 19, 1957, will prejudice him
but this ordinarily is not sufficient ground for refusing
to vacate .... (Omissions ours.)
IX. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO SUSTAIN DEMURRER
ON GROUND NOT RAISED IN DEMURRER
In Wallace v. Timmons,36 an action by a receiver of an in-
solvent insurance company against the widow of a former
agent of the company for an accounting, the trial court sus-
tained a demurrer for three reasons, one of which was that
the claim was barred by laches. This was not one of the
grounds of the demurrer, but the Supreme Court held that in
proper cases it could be considered by the court on its own
motion even though not pleaded, since it is not necessary to
set up laches in a formal manner. The Court went on to say,
however, that laches is usually a matter of defense, raised by
the answer, and that in this particular case the question of
whether there was in fact laches on the part of the plaintiff
should not have been decided on demurrer, but should have
awaited trial of the case and examination of the witnesses.
X. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO BRING
IN ADDITIONAL PARTIES
In Singleton v. Singleton37 one heir of an-intestate brought
action against the administrator for an accounting. In addi-
tion to the parties there were nine other heirs at law of the
deceased. The administrator moved for an order requiring
that the other heirs be brought in as parties "necessary to a
complete determination of the controversies" and to "avoid
a multiplicity of actions." The trial judge granted the motion,
ordering plaintiff to amend his pleadings so as to bring them
in and to take such steps as necessary to make them either
parties plaintiff or parties defendant.
The Supreme Court affirmed, referring to Sections 10-202,
10-203, and 10-20438 as to who may be joined as parties, and
Section 10-21939 concerning the power of the court to cause
36. 232 S. C. 311, 101 S. E. 2d 844 (1958).
37. 232 S. C. 441, 102 S. E. 2d 747 (1958).
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other parties to be brought in. It made short shrift of plain-
tiff's argument that the order placed an undue burden on him
in trying to get the other heirs before the court, pointing out
that they could be brought in as either plaintiffs or defend-
ants, that Section 10-4514o provided a method of service on
non-residents, and in addition, that the record showed that
counsel for the plaintiff was already representing six of the
heirs.
XI. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO CALL WITNESSES
In Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores,41 an action for malicious
prosecution, the question arose in the trial court as to the
nature of the offense for which the present plaintiff was tried
and acquitted in the Greenville Municipal Court. Of its own
motion the court below called as a witness the Assistant City
Attorney who had conducted the prosecution in Municipal
Court; it also called the officer who signed the warrant.
The Supreme Court approved this procedure, pointing out
that the Municipal Court was not a court of record and that
the witnesses were testifying as to their own knowledge. The
Court said: "The Court may of its own motion call a witness
and examine same even out of order".
XII. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO REOPEN CASE
FOR MORE EVIDENCE
In the case of Nash v. Gardner42 the Supreme Court upheld
the refusal of the trial court to reopen the case to admit addi-
tional evidence proffered by the defendant. The additional
evidence was cumulative, and the affidavit of the single pro-
posed witness was not offered at the time of the motion but
some three months thereafter. The granting or refusal of the
motion was discretionary, and no abuse of discretion was
found.
XIII. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO EXTEND
TIME FOR APPEAL
In Ex parte Mutual Motors43 one Hobbs obtained a default
judgment against Simms and a Chrysler auto, issued execution
which was returned nulla bona, then brought action against
Mutual Motors for alleged conversion of the auto with knowl-
40. Ibid.
41. 231 S. C. 565, 99 S. E. 2d 384 (1957).
42. 232 S. C. 215, 101 S. E. 2d 283 (1957).
43. 232 S. C. 18, 100 S. E. 2d 538 (1957).
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edge of the lien. Mutual Motors moved to reopen the default
judgment and, when this was denied, served timely notice of
appeal. It then moved for an extension of time within which
to perfect the appeal until thirty days after the conversion
action could be decided, which motion was granted. Hobbs
appealed, alleging error in granting "an indefinite time within
which to perfect its appeal."
The Supreme Court noted that the appeal might be dis-
missed for irrelevancy of the exception, since the extension
was not for an indefinite time, but proceeded to consider the
merits, holding that the Richland County Court has the same
jurisdiction as circuit courts to extend the time for perfecting
appeals on motion timely made. This power should be exer-
cised with reasonable discretion, which was abundantly pres-
ent here in the possibility of avoiding a multiplicity of appeals.
XIV. POWER OF TRIAL COURT TO SETTLE
RECORD ON APPEAL
In Bank for Savings and Trusts v. Towe14 the appellant
and respondent were unable to agree as to certain contents
of transcript of record and applied to the trial judge for an
order settling the record. The Supreme Court held:
Over the objection of the appellants, Judge Littlejohn,
settling the case on appeal, allowed the respondents pro-
posed amendment to the effect that Mr. Means "was still
active in the pending case", and that the proceding is
"still pending in said Court".
We agree that there should not be included in the
statement a disputed fact where there is an objection
made by one of the parties to the action .... However,
this holding does not require a reversal of the order of
Judge Littlejohn. (Emphasis added.)
XV. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY
Section 10-121045 which permits counsel to present objec-
tions to judge's charge or request for additional instructions,
was construed in Goodwin v. Harrison.4 There the Court
held that the provision does not contemplate written objec-
tion or requests for additional instructions. And in Tate t'. Le-
44. 231 S. C. 268, 98 S. E. 2d 539 (1957).
45. 1957 Cumulative Supplement to CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952, adopted 1953 STATUTES AT LARGE, p. 28.
46. 231 S. C. 243, 98 S. E. 2d 255 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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MHaster47 the Court held that counsel are required to make
their positions on the judge's charge absolutely clear or they
will be held to have waived any objections.
In Lundy v. Lititz Mutual Ins. Co.48 the trial judge appar-
ently, in his main charge, charged on the facts in violation of
Art. 5, Section 26 of the South Carolina Constitution. There-
after, following the requirements of section 10-121049 of the
Code, the jury was excused to give counsel an opportunity
to request further instructions or make objections. Counsel
for the insurer made an additional request but interposed no
objection to what had already been charged. The jury was
recalled, the additional request was charged, and the court
then gave certain other instructions which the insurer con-
tended amounted to a charge on the facts. The Supreme Court,
though intimating that it agreed with the insurer, held that
timely objection should have been made at the conclusion of
the main charge, since substantially the same instructions had
already been given there, and stated that "appellant cannot
now complain of the Court's repeating substantially the same
instructions to which counsel failed to object when given an
opportunity to do so."
Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores" was an action for malicious
prosecution in which the plaintiff here had been acquitted in
the Greenville Municipal Court of a charge of taking a jar of
coffee without paying for it, or "shoplifting." The defendant
requested the following charge in the trial court:
... if a person takes an article of merchandise from
its place on the counter of a store and places it in his
pocket so that it is concealed and leaves the premises
without paying for it, he is prima facie presumed to have
so concealed such article with the intention of converting
it to his own use without paying the purchase price
therefor.
The trial judge charged this request, but added that this
presumption is a rebuttable one, that if the person gives a
reasonable explanation he is exonerated, and that it is the
province of the jury to decide whether the presumption has
been rebutted.
47. 231 S. C. 429, 99 S. E. 2d 39 (1957).
48. 232 S. C. 1, 100 S. E. 2d 544 (1957).
49. See note 45 supra.
50. 231 S. C. 565, 99 S. B. 2d 384 (1957).
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The Supreme Court found no error in this modification of
the requested charge. It agreed that the request was in con-
formity with section 16-359.1 et seq. of the 1956 Cumulative
Supplement to the 1952 Code,5' but pointed out that this
criminal presumption statute was passed subsequent to the de-
licts complained of in this case and was therefore inapplicable.
XVI. REOPENING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
Simon v. Flowers52 was a tort action for personal injuries
wherein the defendant failed to plead to the complaint within
the twenty day period prescribed by the Code. Thereafter the
plaintiff's counsel refused to accept service of a proffered
answer and the defendant moved for permission to answer on
the ground that his default had been occasioned by mistake
and excusable neglect. The affidavit of defendant's counsel
indicated that the default was the result of forgetfulness on
his part due to the pressure of business in the trial of cases
and in attending hearings before the Industrial Commission.
The trial court refused leave to answer and granted a default
judgment, and the reviewing court affirmed, pointing out
that section 10-609 of the Code 3 vests discretonary power to
allow an answer in the trial court, not the appellate court.
The Court referred to the constitutional limitation of its appel-
late jurisdiction in law cases to "the correction of errors at
law" and stated that it had no power to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the circuit judge in cases of this nature. It
found no "clear showing" of abuse of discretion on the part
of the court below and permitted the default judgment to
stand.
In Williams v. Ray14 the trial judge's action in refusing to
set aside a default judgment and to permit an answer after
the time for answering had expired was also affirmed. De-
fendant in a tort action was properly served on June 11, 1957
with a summons and complaint bearing a 1956 date. Defend-
ant promptly sent these to his liability insurance company
whose claims department received them June 24, 1957. They
were then forwarded to a Dillon lawyer for answering who
received them June 27, but who returned them the same day
because he could not represent the insurer. On July 8, they
51. Adopted, 1956 STATUTES AT LARGE, p. 1771.
52. 231 S. C. 545, 99 S. E. 2d 391 (1957).
53. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952.
54. 232 S. C. 373, 102 S. E. 2d 368 (1958).
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were received by another lawyer, but he was immediately
told by plaintiff's attorney that the defendant was in default.
On the basis of this, plaintiff obtained a default judgment
against defendant for $5,000.00, and defendant's motion to be
permitted to answer was denied because "excusable neglect"
had not been shown. The result of this case seems very harsh.
It appears that the defendant insurer did just about all it
could do under the circumstances and that its failure to answer
was virtually unavoidable. Surely in a case like this, where
there is an insurance company which conducts the defense
but which is not served with a complaint, the Court should
be liberal in permitting late pleadings. It seems that this is
a question which should be dealt with by the General Assembly
if and when it revises South Carolina's code of civil procedure.
XVII. FORM AND SUFFICIENCY OF OBJECTION
The general rule that assignments of error must be specific
was applied to several cases.
Concrete Mix, Inc. v. James,5 5 an action for goods sold and
delivered, involved several questions affecting procedure. The
Supreme Court held insufficient an exception that the lower
court erred in failing to direct a verdict on the ground "that
plaintiff failed to make out a case against said defendant."
With reference to this exception the Supreme Court said:
The quoted language is that of the second exception.
It is too general and indefinite for consideration. Su-
preme Court rule 4, Sec. 6; "each exception must contain
a concise statement of one proposition of law or fact"
etc....
In answer to the appellant's charge that the lower court
erred in ruling that the issue of an alleged partnership was
not raised by the answer the Supreme Court said:
The answer did not contain specific denial of partner-
ship, which was necessary to make an issue thereabout;
the general denial did not ...... "In a number of juris-
dictions, however, under statutes or rules of court, a plea
of the general issue does not raise the issue of the exist-
ence of the partnership alleged ......
Nor was it error, certainly not an abuse of the Court's
discretion, within which it lay, to deny the motion of
appellant to amend his answer to belatedly deny the
55. 231 S. C. 416, 98 S. E. 2d 841 (1957),
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partnership. It came after the close of plaintiff's case
and it would have been unfair to it to then inject an
issue which was not made by the pleadings upon which
the parties went to trial. If allowed it would have sub-
stantially changed the defense; indeed, it would have
interposed a new defense. (Emphasis added.)
In Large v. Large,"0 the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought the
specific performance of an alleged contract to devise, the de-
fense being, among other things, that the plaintiff had been
guilty of such unfilial conduct toward the deceased that what-
soever rights he might otherwise have had were destroyed.
The plaintiff on appeal contended in his exception (which is
quoted in part) that the trial judge erred in failing to grant
plaintiff specific performance of the contract to devise "upon
the grounds that the plaintiff is entitled to specific perform-
ance thereof as a matter of law, and further that the testi-
mony and evidence failed to show that plaintiff was guilty of
unfilial conduct toward the decedent .... ." The Supreme Court
held that the exception did not comply with its rule 4, Sec. 6.1
With reference to the question of whether or not the lower
court correctly ruled that the plaintiff because of his unfilial
conduct was not entitled to specific performance, the Court
said:
Whether or not the premise thus stated is a sound
principle of law, applicable generally to contracts of this
nature, is a matter that we need not decide. Its correct-
ness is not challenged by the exception here, and it is
therefore the law of the case ....
In Saxon v. Saxon58 the Court said that the allegation by
appellant that the jury's verdict was "contrary to the law
and the evidence" was held to be too general to be considered.
A like holding was made in Tate v. LeMaster."9
The Court stated in Shayne of Miami, Inc. v. Greybow,
Inc.60 that it is not the function of the Court to supply grounds
for reversal of the lower court. But in Reaves v. Stone 1 the
Court went further than the respondents' briefs and, in af-
firming partial disallowance of claim for improvements, held
56. 232 S. C. 70, 100 S. E. 2d 825 (1957).
57. Supreme Court Rules, found in Vol. 7, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952.
58. 231 S. C. 378, 98 S. E. 2d 803 (1957).
59. 231 S. C. 429, 99 S. E. 2d 39 (1957).
60. 292 S. C. 161, 101 S. E. 2d 486 (1957).
61. 231 S. C. 628, 99 S. E. 2d 729 (1957).
[Vol. 11
20
South arolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/16
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
that ejected trespassers were entitled to no allowance for im-
provements. The Court relied on Supreme Court Rule 4, Sec-
tion 8,612 which provides that the Court may affirm a decision
for any reason appearing in the record.
However, the Court does not always insist on the Rule. The
power of the Supreme Court to consider exceptions which do
not comply with Rule 4, Section 663 was reaffirmed in Wallace
v. Timmons.64 The Court found that the exceptions did not
comply with the rule in that they were general and indefinite,
but proceeded to consider them anyway to reverse the court
below, because they attempted to present meritorious assign-
ments of error. Mr. Justice Oxner, concurring, agreed that
the exceptions should be considered, because appellant was a
receiver, an officer of the Court, and referred his colleagues
to his dissenting opinion in Shayne of Miami, Inc. v. Greybow,
Inc., supra, where the majority had held that it was not the
function of an appellate court to supply a ground for reversal
where the exceptions fail to do so. In that case the dissent
pointed out that the majority was affirming upon a ground
not presented or passed upon in the lower court, and stated:
If this may be done for a respondent in an ordinary
case, no good reason appears why we cannot sua sponte
raise the proper grounds upon which this claim should be
defended by an officer of this Court.
XVIII. REVIEW OF LAW QUESTIONS
Metze v. Meetze65 stated that a conclusion of law (as op-
posed to a conclusion in equity) will be supported if there is
any evidence or inference therefrom which tends reasonably
to support the conclusion. And in Taylor v. Hardee6 6 the Court
refused to reduce the amount of a verdict, saying it would do
so only if the amount clearly indicates it was the result of
passion, prejudice, caprice, or otherwise not founded on the
evidence.
Robinson v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co.67 was a suit brought
on a disability policy by an assured who had been shot by an-
other tried before a judge without a jury. The judge found
62. Supreme Court Rules, Vol. 7, CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952.
63. Ibid.
64. 232 S. C. 311, 101 S. E. 2d 844 (1958).
65. 231 S. C. 154, 97 S. E. 2d 514 (1957).
66. 232 S. C. 338, 102 S. E. 2d 218 (1958).
67. 232 S. C. 268, 101 S. E. 2d 664 (1958).
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for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court, saying:
This is an action at law, tried by the Judge without
a jury. His findings of fact have the same force and
effect as the verdict of a jury; unless he has committed
some error of law leading him to an erroneous conclu-
sion, or unless the evidence is reasonably susceptible
of the opposite conclusion only, his findings of fact must
be accepted by this Court.
XIX. REVIEW WHERE OBJECTIONS NOT TIMELY MADE
The case of Bailes v. Southern Ry.68 involves two points
under this topic. Damages were sought for wrongful death
as a result of being run over by a train. The plaintiff offered
evidence that the deceased was a licensee, which evidence was
excluded on the ground that this fact had not been pleaded.
Later the trial court reversed itself and announced that such
evidence could be admitted, but plaintiff did not choose to
reopen and reoffer this evidence. The Supreme Court found
no prejudicial error affecting the rights of defendant, since
"such testimony as had been admitted relative to the status of
the deceased prior to this was either without objection on the
part of appellant, and cross-examined relative thereto, or
through its own witness."
In its appeal the railroad contended that noise arising from
construction adjacent to the courthouse had made it difficult
to hear the witnesses and follow the proceedings, and that this
was the cause of some of the testimony not being objected to.
But the Court refused to consider this for the first time on
appeal, stating that the record failed to disclose any complaint
to the trial court at the time.
The time to object to evidence may begin with the pleadings.
The right to object may be waived if the litigant has not pre-
viously objected to allegations of a pleading to which such
evidence is responsive.
Thus, in Lundy v. Lititz Mutual Ins. Co.00 the appellant in-
surance company charged error in the admission of certain
testimony relating to admissions of liability allegedly made
by its agent after the fire loss. The Court found that the testi-
mony in controversy was responsive to certain allegations of
the complaint, and said:
68. 231 S. C. 474, 99 S. E. 2d 195 (1957).
69. 232 S. C. 1, 100 S. E. 2d 544 (1957).
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If appellant deemed this allegation irrelevant or preju-
dicial, motion should have been made to strike. Having
failed to do so, complaint cannot now be made of the
admission of testimony responsive to the allegation.
XX. REVIEW OF POINTS NOT MADE BELOW
Few principles seem more certain than that the Supreme
Court will refuse to consider any matter or assignment of
error where a proper basis has not been laid in the lower
court. It has already been pointed out that in Tate v. Le-
Master70 the Court held that if counsel failed to make his
position on the judge's charge clear, he would be deemed to
have waived any objections to defects. In Howle v. McDaniel"-
the Court, in reversing the direction of a verdict against the
plaintiff and affirming the direction of a verdict against de-
fendant on his counterclaim, stated that it could not pass on
whether plaintiff should have judgment because he had failed
to move for a directed verdict in his favor.
In Surfside Development Co. v. Reynolds72 the Court ruled
that in a case where plaintiff recovered actual damages
against principal and agent and punitive damages against
principal only and where defendant moved for judgment
n. o. v. or new trial on general grounds, the Court would not
consider whether punitive damages against the principal
should be set aside, because this was not presented to the
lower court.
In Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 73 the
Court refused to consider a venue question not raised in the
lower court.
See also White v. Livingston74 reviewed elsewhere herein,
wherein the Supreme Court held that after the case had been
tried as an action to set aside a deed for fraud, the appellant
could not be heard to complain on appeal that the deed should
have been construed to be an equitable mortgage.
In Barnwell Production Credit Ass'n v. Hartzog"5 the de-
fendant-appellant contended that the lower court had erred
in treating a certain statement of the plaintiff's counsel as
70. 231 S. C. 429, 99 S. E. 2d 39 (1957), discussed supra under "In-
structions to Jury".
71. 232 S. C. 125, 101 S. E. 2d 255 (1957).
72. 231 S. C. 508, 99 S. E. 2d 49 (1957).
73. 232 S. C. 358, 102 S. E. 2d 266 (1958).
74. 231 S. C. 301, 98 S. E. 2d 534 (1957).
75. 231 S. C. 340, 98 S. E. 2d 835 (1957).
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being in the nature of an election of remedies when no notice
of election had been served upon the defendant. The Supreme
Court took the view that the counsel's statement was not
accepted by the lower court as an election of remedies but
merely as an expression of the plaintiff's opinion as to the
nature of its case. The Supreme Court held, however:
But even if counsel's statement had amounted to an
election of remedies, appellant's exception cannot be con-
sidered because the issue proposed by it was not pre-
sented to the Circuit Judge.
Again in Concrete Mix, Inc. v. James7" there was a suit on
account wherein the appellant sought a new trial and in-
cluded an objection to the admission in evidence of certain
ledger sheets affecting the account in suit. The Supreme
Court dismissed the objection, saying: "However, his coun-
sel's cross-examination of the witness concerning them, with-
out reservation of the objection, makes it unavailable on ap-
peal and we need not consider the merits of the question... ."
In Lawlor v. Scheper77 a purchaser of real estate obtained
a verdict for actual damages against the vendor and his
agents because of the agents' misrepresentation as to the
amount owing on the mortgages covering the property. On
appeal the agents argued the defense that a notation on the
contract of sale recommended that "your attorney examine
this title". The court refused to consider this point, since
negligence on the part of the purchaser was not made a
ground of appeal in the exceptions. The court did point out,
however, that examination of title would not have disclosed
the balances due on the mortgages being assumed.
Other cases wherein the Supreme Court declined to consider
points which it held were not made below are listed in the
footnote.7 8
XXI. REVIEW OF DAMAGES
The question of excessiveness of a verdict was before the
Court in Benton v. PelluM,79 where an infant guest recovered
76. 231 S. C. 416, 98 S. E. 2d 841 (1957).
77. 232 S. C. 94, 101 S. E. 2d 269 (1957).
78. See also Goodwin v. Harrison, 231 S. C. 243, 98 S. E. 2d 255
(1957), reviewed under "Instructions to Jury" supra; Kerr v. City of
Columbia, 232 S. C. 405, 102 S. E. 2d 364 (1958); Wise v. Picow, 232
S. C. .237, 101 S. E. 2d 651 (1958); Metze v. Meetze, 231 S. C. 154, 97
S. E. 2d 514 (1957).
79. 232 S. C. 26, 100 S. E. 2d 534 (1957).
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a verdict of $4,500.00 actual and $4,500.00 punitive damages
against her driver. The trial court granted a new trial unless
she remitted $2,000.00 of the verdict for punitive damages,
which was done and judgment entered for $7,000.00. De-
fendant alleged error in refusing a new trial absolute on the
ground that the "verdict was so excessive that it was clearly
the result of caprice, passion or prejudice." The Court af-
firmed, referring to the fact that the child had sustained
headaches, nervousness, frequent blackouts and a concussion
as a result of the accident.
In Jeffers v. Hardeman"8 the trial jury awarded the plain-
tiff truck operator actual damages of $750 and punitive dam-
ages of a like amount. His minor passenger, suing the same
defendant in an action which by agreement was tried with the
trucker's case, was awarded $100 actual damages and $2000
punitive damages. The trial judge refused the defendant's
motion for judgment n.o.v. but did grant a new trial in the
minor's action unless she remitted on the record $1,250 of
the verdict for punitive damages. In this new trial order the
lower court compared the two verdicts and referred to the fact
that in the minor's case the punitive damages amounted to
tventy times the verdict for actual damages.
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the new trial
nisi was granted in the exercise of the trial court's discre-
tion, which discretion the reviewing court felt was properly
exercised.
In Parnell v. Carolina Coca Cola Bottling Co.8 1 the Supreme
Court held with reference to appellant's contention that the
verdict was excessive:
This was included in appellant's motion for a new
trial, and over-ruled by the Lower Court which alone had
jurisdiction to reduce the verdict by means of an order
for a new trial nisi. We agree with the Trial Court and
we cannot reverse on this ground in view of the sickness
and suffering of respondent: Certainly it cannot be said
that the amount of the verdict indicates passion, preju-
dice, caprice or other considerations not founded upon
the evidence, which would be necessary for reversal.
However, see Nelson v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.8- 2 where the
Supreme Court granted a new trial to the appellant railroad
80. 231 S. C. 578, 99 S. E. 2d 402 (1957).
81. 231 S. C. 426, 98 S. E. 2d 834 (1957).
82. 231 S. C. 351, 98 S. E. 2d 798 (1957).
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sued for wrongful death on the grounds that the verdict given
by the jury was excessive. The verdict of $35,000 actual dam-
ages plus $17,500 punitive damages for the benefit of two
brothers of a 58 year old woman was reduced by the trial
judge by $6,000. The Supreme Court said:
Even after giving due consideration to the diminished
purchasing power of the dollar, we are convinced that
upon the scant evidence presented, a verdict for $35,000
actual damages (reduced by the trial Judge to $29,000)
is not supported by the evidence and cannot be explained
on any rational basis. Whether it was the result of sym-
pathy, passion or prejudice or whether it was due to
mistake or misapprehension of the charge and issues in-
volved, the result is the same. In the discharge of our
duty we cannot escape the responsibility of setting it
aside.
XXII. REVIEW OF CONCURRENT FINDINGS
The scope of the Court's review in equity cases was the
subject of several cases. In Wise v. Picow8 3 the Court reaf-
firmed the "two judge rule" that findings of a master con-
curred in by the circuit court would not be disturbed unless
without any evidence to support them or against the clear
preponderance of the evidence. In Metze v. Meetze 4 the rule
in equity appeals was stated to be that the Court will affirm
if the "clear preponderance" of the evidence supports the find-
ing. In Simonds v. Simonds 5 the court reversed the master
and trial judge's award of lump sum alimony, support, and
attorneys' fees on the grounds that the decision was contrary
to the preponderance of the evidence.
In Holling v. Margiotta,86 an action in equity to enjoin the
alleged violation of residentially restricted property by busi-
ness usage, it was held that the findings of the master, con-
curred in by the trial court, that a limited amount of busi-
ness activity nearby had not changed the residential character
of the subdivision, were conclusive on appeal because they
were not without evidence to support them and were not
against the clear preponderance of the evidence.
83. 232 S. C. 237, 101 S. E. 2d 651 (1958).
84. 231 S. C. 154, 97 S. E. 2d 514 (1957).
85. 232 S. C. 185, 101 S. E. 2d 494 (1957).
86. 231 S. C. 676, 100 S. E. 2d 397 (1957).
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In Dobson v. Atkinson 7 the father sought to restrain the
mother, from whom he had been divorced on the ground of her
desertion, from removing their daughter from the jurisdiction
of the Richland County Court. The Supreme Court affirmed
the findings of fact by the master, concurred in by the trial
court, that the mother was a fit person to have custody and
that she should be permitted to take the child with her to For-
mosa. It referred to the fact that an action for divorce is within
the equity jurisdiction of the Court, that concurrent findings
will not be disturbed unless they are without evidentiary sup-
port or against the clear preponderance of the evidence, and
further that the recommendation of the master here is entitled
to considerable weight because of his opportunity to observe
the witnesses.
XXIII. LAW OF THE CASE
This familiar phrase occurs in several of last term's de-
cisions. In Kerr v. City of Columbi 88 the Court said that the
conclusions of a master, if not challenged by exceptions to his
report, become the "law of the case" and will not be reversed
or even considered on appeal. This in effect is an application
of the rule that the Court will not consider matters not prop-
erly presented below. A more far-reaching decision is Nelson
v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.89 In a prior appeal of the same
ease, the Court had held that evidence of negligence was suf-
ficient to go to the jury. In the second trial, the evidence was
substantially the same. On appeal from the second trial, the
Court refused to consider whether a nonsuit or verdict should
have been directed, holding that the Court's ruling in the first
appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence was the "law of the
case" and controlling.
Disposing of the railroad's contention in the Nelson case
that the lower court should have directed a verdict, the Su-
preme Court said:
The same contention was raised on the first appeal. In
overruling same, we said: "As the case must be remanded
for a new trial, we shall not discuss in detail the evidence,
which was conflicting. In our opinion, it was sufficient
to carry to the jury the issues of both actual and puni-
tive damages." There was no petition for a rehearing by
appellant.
87. 232 S. C. 12, 100 S. E. 2d 531 (1957).
88. 232 S. C. 405, 102 S. E. 2d 364 (1958).
89. 231 S. C. 351, 98 S. E. 2d 798 (1958).
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We think our conclusion on the first appeal that the
evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of the
case to the jury as to both actual and punitive damages
is the "law of the case ....
On the first appeal it was fully argued and carefully
considered by this Court. After the decision was ren-
dered, appellant again had the opportunity of raising the
question by petition for a rehearing but failed to do
so ....
Of course, the doctrine of "the law of the case" has no
application where the facts relating to the question de-
cided are substantially different on a second appeal. In
order to escape the application of the doctrine, however,
there must be a material change in the evidence. (Omis-
sions ours and emphasis added.)
In Large v. Large,90 a proceeding involving an alleged con-
tract to devise, the Circuit Court had held that because of the
unfilial conduct on the part of the plaintiff warranted the
refusal by the court of equity to exercise in plaintiff's behalf
its power to compel specific performance of the alleged con-
tract to devise. The Supreme Court said:
Whether or not the premise thus stated is a sound
principle of law, applicable generally to contracts of this
nature, is a matter that we need not decide. Its correct-
ness is not challenged by the exception here, and it is
therefore the law of the case.
In White v. Livingston9i plaintiff proceeded in equity to set
aside a deed for fraud. The referee found against plaintiff,
who, on appeal contended that the referee should have found
the deed to be an equitable mortgage. The Supreme Court
said:
However, there was no exception to the finding of the
referee that, quoting from the report, "[the action] is for
the purpose of setting aside a deed on the grounds of
fraud." It thereby became the law of the case.
In Watkins v. Hodge92 the plaintiff brought claim and de-
livery against the defendant to recover an automobile which
the defendant acquired at a County Fair lottery with plain-
tiff's tickets. Before answering, the defendant demurred to
90. 232 S. C. 70, 100 S. E. 2d 825 (1957).
91. 231 S. C. 301, 98 S. E. 2d 534 (1957).
92. 232 S. C. 245, 101 S. E. 2d 657 (1958).
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the complaint upon the ground that it showed upon its face
that the subject matter of the action was a lottery prize and
the Court would not enforce an agreement relating to such.
The demurrer was overruled by formal order from which there
was no appeal, After trial and judgment for the plaintiff the
defendant appealed. on the lottery question. The Supxeme
Court held:
This contention was concluded adversely to apelaklat,
i.nsofar as this case is concerned, by the unappealed
order overruling the demurrer which was upon that
ground, and the order became the law of the case.
In Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Joyce,93 a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding, the lower court had stricken certain counter-
claims from the answer, and the defendant had not appealed
therefrom. Later, when defendant sought to amend the answer
in other respects, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's refusal to permit the amendments on the grounds inter
alia that to have allowed them would have overruled the order
striking the counterclaims which, not having been appealed,
became "law of the case".
See also, Bank for Savings and Trusts v. Towe9 4 where the
Court applied the "law of the case" doctrine to a class action,
when there was no appeal from an order holding that certain
persons had an interest in a trust fund, and the order had left
the case open for other persons similarly situated to intervene.
93. 231 S. C. 493, 99 S. E. 2d 187 (1957).
94. 231 S. C. 268, 93 S. E. 2d 539 (1957).
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